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Weiss: Smith v. Westland Life Insurance Co.

SMITH v. WESTLAND LIFE INSURANCE CO.
INSURANCE-Termination of Interim Insurance Coverage-Notice
in the absence of a refund of the initialpremium is not sufficient
to terminate a contractfor temporary insurance. 15 Cal. 3d 111,
539 P.2d 433, 123 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1975).
In Smith v. Westland Life Insurance Co., 1 the Supreme
Court of California resolved a question raised but left unanswered
more than 20 years ago in the landmark case of Ransom v. Penn
Mutual Life Insurance Co. :' where an applicant for life insurance
pays an amount equal to the first premium in return for a conditional receipt 3 which results in interim coverage, by what method
can the insurance company terminate such coverage?
In Smith, after meeting with the carrier's agent, the plaintiff's decedent decided to apply for life insurance protection in the
amount of $3,000. The plan provided for the distribution of an
additional $3,000 in the event of accidental death and included a
clause which waived payment of the premium in the event of total
disability. Smith signed an application form and paid an amount
equal to the first premium. In exchange, he was given a conditional receipt of the insurability type.4
1. 15 Cal. 3d 111, 539 P.2d 433, 123 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1975) (in bank).
2. 43 Cal. 2d 420, 274 P.2d 633 (1954). The Ransom court noted:
We need not decide . . . whether, as suggested by some courts, [a contract for
temporary insurance] can be terminated only by actual rejection of the application and return of the premium payment.
Id., 274 P.2d at 636.
3. Generally, conditional receipts may be classified as of either the "insurability" or
the "approval" type. Where the approval form is employed, immediate coverage is conditioned upon the company's approval of the terms specified in the application. On the other
hand, the typical insurability receipt provides that immediate coverage is conditioned
upon a finding that the applicant is insurable under industry standards as of the date of
the application or the medical examination, whichever is later. O'Neill, Interim Coverage:
Conditional Receipts, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 571, 574-75.
The purchaser of life insurance may choose not to pay an amount equal to the first
premium upon completion of the appli.cation in which case no conditional receipt is issued
and no interim coverage is provided. The application is viewed as soliciting an offer by
the company. This is commonly referred to as C.O.D. issuance. The offer is made by the
company when it delivers the policy and is accepted when the first premium is paid. Thus,
no liability is undertaken by the company until the formal policy has been accepted by
the applicant. Fortunato, ConditionalReceipts: Should the UninsurableHave Insurance?,
1 FoRuM, April 1966, at 5, 6.
4. The conditional receipt provided in pertinent part:
I. That if the Company at its Home Office after investigation shall be satisfied
that on the date hereof, or on the date of the medical examination for such
insurance, whichever is later, each person proposed for insurance was insurable
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At the routine medical examination, Smith was found to be
in excellent health, but a subsequent investigation revealed that
he was engaged in a hazardous occupation. The company therefore offered to issue a modified policy which did not provide for
accidental death benefits or for the waiver of premium payments
in case of total disability. A number of attempts by company
salesmen to persuade Smith to accept the changes and pay a
higher premium proved futile. At the close of the final meeting
between the parties, Smith was told that his premium would be
refunded. The next day, before the premium had been returned,
Smith was killed in an automobile accident. Upon the failure of
the company to pay the benefits for which Smith had applied,
the plaintiff brought suit in her capacity as administratrix of her
husband's estateA
Ransom v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. I established the
rule that the conditional receipt creates coverage as of the date
of the application. Such interim coverage incorporates all the
terms of the policy sought by the prospective purchaser. The issue
in Smith was whether oral notice of rejection to the applicant is
sufficient to terminate the existing temporary coverage. 7 Finding
notice alone to be insufficient, the Smith court announced that
the carrier would be required to satisfy a dual requirement before
temporary coverage could be terminated. The court declared:'
[W]here, as here, the insurer has received an application for
insurance together with payment of the premium and thereafter
and entitled under the Company's rules and standards to insurance on the plan
and for the amount applied for. . ., the insurance protection applied for shall
by reason for such payment . . . take effect from the date hereof or from the
date of such medical examination, whichever is later.
Smith v. Westland Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 3d 111, 113-14 n.3, 539 P.2d 433, 435 n.3, 123
Cal. Rptr. 649, 651 n.3 (1975).
5. Id. at 114-15, 539 P.2d at 435-36, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 651-52.
6. 43 Cal. 2d 420, 274 P.2d 633 (1954).
Ransom has been influential in a number of jurisdictions. See, e.g., Farmers New
World Life Ins. Co. v. Crites, 29 Colo. App. 394, 487 P.2d 608 (1971); Toevs v. Western
Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 94 Idaho 151, 483 P.2d 682 (1971); Prudential Ins. Co. of
America v. Lamme, 83 Nev. 146, 425 P.2d 346 (1967); Allen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
44 N.J. 294, 208 A.2d 638 (1965); Long v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 29 Utah 2d 204,
507 P.2d 375 (1973). It may be assumed that the Smith decision will have a similar impact.
7. The trial court ruled in favor of the insurance company and held that a contract
for temporary insurance is terminated by rejection of the application and notice to the
applicant. Smith v. Westland Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 3d 111, 116, 539 P.2d 433, 436, 123
Cal. Rptr. 649, 652 (1975).
8. Id. at 121, 539 P.2d at 440, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 656.
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decides to reject it, the contract of insurance immediately created upon the receipt of the application and payment of the
premium is not terminated until (a) the insurer has actually
rejected the application and by appropriate notice communicated such rejection to the insured and (b) refunded the premium payment to the insured.

In reaching its conclusion, the Smith court utilized a mode
of analysis similar to that employed previously in the Ransom
decision. In Ransom, upon payment of an amount equal to the
first premium, the applicant was given a conditional receipt of
the insurability type.' Before the company could issue a formal
policy, the applicant was killed in an automobile accident. The
company returned the premium to the decedent's wife but refused to make any further payment.
Writing for the Ransom court, Chief Justice Gibson determined that "a contract of insurance arose upon [the carrier's]
receipt of the completed application and the first premium payment."10 The court premised this conclusion upon the fact that
the language of the conditional receipt" was ambiguous.'2 The
court declared that such ambiguities must be resolved by reference to the "understanding of an ordinary person,"' 3 and con9. 43 Cal. 2d 420, 274 P.2d 633, 634 (1954). See also note 3 supra.
10. Id., 274 P.2d at 635.
11. The receipt in Ransom provided:
If the first premium is paid in full in exchange for the attached receipt. . . when
this application is signed the insurance shall be in force, subject to the terms
and conditions of the policy applied for, from the date of Part I or Part II of this
application, whichever is the later, provided the Company shall be satisfied that
the Proposed Insured was at that date acceptable under the Company's rules
for insurance upon the plan at the rate of premium and for the amount applied
for, but that if such first premium is not so paid or if the Company is not
satisfied as to such acceptability, no insurance shall be in force until both the
first premium is paid in full and the policy is delivered ....
Id., 274 P.2d at 634.
12. The court observed:
The clause . . . is subject to the interpretation that the applicant is offered a
choice of either paying his first premium when he signs the application, in which
event "the insurance shall be in force . . . from the date . . . of the application," or of paying upon receipt of the policy, in which event "no insurance shall
be in force until . . . the policy is delivered."
Id., 274 P.2d at 635-36.
13. Id., 274 P.2d at 636.
The judicial inclination to protect the weaker party to an adhesion contract by
construing the contract in accordance with that party's reasonable expectations has been
discussed by a number of commentators. See, e.g., Patterson, The Interpretation and
Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 854 (1964); Tobriner & Grodin, The
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cluded that the ordinary individual "would believe that he would
secure the benefit of immediate coverage by paying the premium15
...

'N' After noting the "obvious advantage to the company''

in securing immediate payment of the premium, the court announced:'"
[lit would be unconscionable to permit the company, after
using language to induce payment of the premium at that time,
to escape the obligation which an ordinary applicant would reasonably believe had been undertaken by the insurer.
Since the company had unilaterally drafted the terms of the
receipt,'" it could have explained the terms clearly if if had desired to do so. The court therefore resolved the ambiguity created
by the insurance company in favor of the beneficiary."8
That the applicant in Ransom may have been uninsurable by
industry standards was not decisive of the question of interim
Individual and the PublicService Enterprisein the New Industrial State, 55 CAL. L. REv.
1247, 1273-76 (1967); Note, Insurance: The Meaning of the Contract in Light of the
Insured's Reasonable Expectations, 2 LINCOLN L. REV. 157 (1967).
14. 43 Cal. 2d 420, 274 P.2d 633, 636 (1954).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. It has been frequently observed that insurance contracts are contracts of
adhesion. See, e.g., Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83
HARV. L. REV. 961, 966 (1970); Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 633 (1943); Lenhoff, Contracts of Adhesion
and the Freedom of Contract:A Comparative Study in the Light of American and Foreign
Law, 36 TUL. L. REV. 481, 483 (1962); Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy,
33 HARv. L. REv. 198, 222 (1919).
Professor Kessler has noted:
Standard contracts are typically used by enterprises with strong bargaining
power. The weaker party, in need of the goods or services, is frequently not in a
position to shop around for better terms, either because the author of the standard contract has a monopoly (natural or artificial) or because all competitors
use the same clauses. His contractual intention is but a subjection. . . to terms
dictated by the stronger party, terms whose consequences are often understood
only in a vague way, if at all.
Kessler, supra, at 632.
18. Ransom v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 43 Cal. 2d 420, 425, 274 P.2d 633, 636
(1954).
[T]he canon contra proferentem is more rigorously applied in insurance than
in other contracts [footnote omitted], in recognition of the difference between
the parties in their acquaintance with the subject matter.
Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599, 602 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331
U.S. 849 (1947).
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coverage. 9 The court cited a number of cases" to support the view
21
that:
[T]he proviso that the company shall be satisfied that the
insured was acceptable at the date of the application creates
only a right to terminate the confract if the company becomes
dissatisfied with the risk before a policy is issued.
Thus, where an applicant for life insurance dies before the
company reaches a decision regarding insurability, the beneficiaries' claim must be satisfied unless the conditional receipt
clearly specifies that insurability is a condition precedent to coverage.2 2 If the conditional receipt fails to adequately disclaim interim liability, Ransom requires that the applicant who pays an
amount equal to the first premium receive interim coverage.'
This is the price California courts require insurance companies to
bear for failing to clearly delineate the conditions under which
coverage will be made available to the applicant.
In reaching its decision, the Smith court purported to apply
19. 43 Cal. 2d 420, 425, 274 P.2d 633, 636 (1954); see Comment, "Binding Receipts"
in California,7 STAN. L. REV. 292, 298 (1955).
20. Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
331 U.S. 849 (1947); Occidental Life Ins. Co. of California v. Lame Elk White Horse, 74
A.2d 435 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1950); Reck v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 116 N.J.L.
444, 184 A. 777 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936); Duncan v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 137
Ohio St. 441, 31 N.E.2d 88 (1940); Albers v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 41 S.D. 270, 170
N.W. 159 (1918).
21. 43 Cal. 2d 420, 424, 274 P.2d 633, 635 (1955). But see O'Neill, Interim Coverage:
Conditional Receipts, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 571, 578-85; Comment, "Binding Receipts" in
California,supra note 19, at 299 n.28.
22. This development has not gone without criticism. See, e.g., Fortunato, supranote
3, where it is suggested that interim coverage for the uninsurable applicant is inconsistent
with established principles of insurance law:
The insurer's right to select its risk is in accord with the entire philosophy of
the law as it applies to life insurance. The courts and the legislature have long
recognized the previously unqualified right of a life insurer to decide what applicants it will insure. The entire underwriting process, including application,
investigation and evaluation is directed to this end.
Id. at 22.
23. In Wernecke v. Pacific Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 238 Cal. App. 2d 884, 48 Cal. Rptr.
251 (1965), the plaintiff's decedent exchanged an amount equal to the first premium for
a conditional receipt of the insurability type. He died the following day. In discussing the
legal effect of the receipt, the court observed:
In any event, the language used does not foreclose the implication by the ordinary layman that upon payment of the premium requested he is insured until
the company advises him it is not satisfied he is insurable under the plan
selected.
Id. at 887-88, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
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the same principles that were instrumental in Ransom. It postulated that an applicant's expectation of coverage is premised on
two acts-the signing of the application and the payment 25
of an
4
amount equal to the first premium. The court concluded:
This reasonable expectation on the part of the applicant would
. . .extend to a continuance of such coverage until the insurer
had nullified the two factors responsible for its existence- the
application for the policy by rejection and notice of rejection,
and the payment of premium by a refund of it.
The court's application of a reasonable expectations analysis
demonstrates the extremely malleable nature of the concept. The
court observed that an applicant could reasonably expect that
notice would be insufficient to terminate temporary coverage unless accompanied by the return of the initial premium. Since the
conditional receipt failed to disclose the method of termination,
the expectations of the applicant would be controlling.
However justifiable the reasonable expectations analysis
might have been in Ransom, its application in Smith is not only
unnecessary but detracts from the strength of the court's opinion.
At the heart of the majority opinion is the proposition that a
reasonable consumer would expect coverage to continue despite
being unequivocally informed to the contrary. As Justice Clark
noted in his dissent in Smith, a consumer who has been rejected
has "no basis . . . for believing that insurance will continue.""
In light of the court's strained analysis, it is appropriate to
reconsider the issues to determine whether an alternative approach would accomplish the same result. It is submitted that the
unconscionable character of the transaction, independent of
ambiguities real or contrived, 27 requires that interim coverage
continue until the premium is returned to the applicant.
The Ransom court noted that interim coverage could be
avoided if the carrier were willing to make its intentions clear.
24. Smith v. Westland Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 3d 111, 123, 539 P.2d 433, 442, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 649, 658 (1975).
25. Id. at 123, 539 P.2d at 442, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 658.
26. Id. at 128-29, 539 P.2d at 446, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 662 (Clark, J., dissenting).
27. "[I]n their protective function courts have been known to create ambiguities in
order to be able to bring their interpretative power into play." Kessler, Forces Shaping
the Insurance Contract, 1954 INS. L.J. 151, 163. Professor Kessler has also stated:
"[M]any courts have shown a remarkable skill in reaching 'just' decisions by construing
ambiguous clauses against their author even in cases where there was no ambiguity."
Kessler, supra note 17, at 633.
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The court stated: "[D]efendant drafted the clause, and had it
wished to make clear that its satisfaction was a condition precedent to a contract, it could easily have done so by using unequivo29
cal terms." 2 This language has been extensively relied upon;
courts have been reluctant to adopt the view that acceptance of
a premium in the absence of temporary coverage is unconscionable per se. In Thompson v. Occidental Life Insurance Co.,10 decided in 1973, the Supreme Court of California reaffirmed the
3
view expressed in Ransom: 1

[Ain insurance company is not precluded from imposing conditions precedent to the effectiveness of insurance coverage despite the advance payment of the first premium. However, as
Ransom explains, any such condition must be stated in conspicuous, unambiguous and unequivocal language ....
It appears, however, that even the most unequivocal disclaimer, standing alone, will not be sufficient to defeat temporary
coverage. Recent cases lend support to the view that if liability
is to be limited, not only must the disclaimer be unequivocal, but
it must also be affirmatively brought to the attention of the applicant.2 Since this further step is required by California courts to
limit the extent of temporary coverage, logically it must be required in order to avoid temporary coverage completely.
Although the drafting problem in this area does not appear
insurmountable,33 companies "have.

.

. failed to clarify the lan-

28. 43 Cal. 2d 420, 425, 274 P.2d 633, 636 (1954).

One commentator has expressed doubt whether the problem is simply a matter of
draftsmanship:

That the company could achieve "retroactive immediate coverage" simply by
redrafting its application and receipt seems doubtful. It is the concept of "retroactive immediate coverage" that is deceptive, not the language of the . . .
receipt.
Comment, "Binding Receipts" in California, supra note 19, at 299-300. See Fortunato,
supra note 3, at 21.
29. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Grant, 268 F.2d 307, 309 (9th Cir. 1959);
Thompson v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 904, 912, 513 P.2d 353, 357, 109 Cal. Rptr.
473, 477 (1973); Wernecke v. Pacific Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 238 Cal. App. 2d 884, 891, 48
Cal. Rptr. 251, 254 (1965); Brunt v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 223 Cal. App. 2d 179, 185,
35 Cal. Rptr. 492, 496 (1963).
30. 9 Cal. 3d 904, 513 P.2d 353, 109 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1973).
31. Id. at 912, 513 P.2d at 357, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
32. Logan v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 41 Cal. App. 3d 988, 116 Cal. Rptr.
528 (1974); Young v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 272 Cal. App. 2d 453, 77 Cal. Rptr. 382
(1969); see Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172
(1962).
33. See, e.g., Palmer v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 324 F. Supp. 254 (D. Me. 1971).
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guage used in such receipts so as to eliminate their patent ambiguities . . . ."I' The failure of carriers to employ available tools
to protect themselves has led one court to speculate:35
[C]ompanies would rather assume a calculated risk in an isolated case . . . than lose the benefits flowing from the general
acceptance of premiums in advance, thus binding and committing the insured immediately to the contract as written.
If Smith were decided solely on the strength of Ransom, it
could be argued that the return of the premium is not required if
the conditional receipt clearly states that written notice is sufficient to terminate coverage, and this was called to the attention
of the applicant. Clearly, such a procedure would not place the
applicant in the confusing and uncertain position which the
Smith court deplored.
The result in Smith rested, however, on an additional consideration. The court declared: 36
Our decision to adopt this rule is fortified by the consideration
recognized in Ransom that it is unconscionable for an insurance
company to hold premiums without providing coverage.
Although this statement is not an altogether accurate appraisal
of the Ransom decision, 3 the factors which may justify the company's retention of an amount equal to the first premium upon
the signing of the application clearly cease to exist once the company has determined not to issue the policy requested. At that
point the company should be required to disgorge the initial payment.
Further, it must be remembered that the conditional receipt
is a contract of adhesion. 8 Therefore, the insurance company, as
34. Smith v. Westland Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 3d 111, 121, 539 P.2d 433, 440, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 649, 656 (1975).
35. Wood v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 193 F. Supp. 371, 374 (N.D. Cal. 1961), aff'd,
302 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1962).
36. 15 Cal. 3d 111, 124, 539 P.2d 433, 443, 123 Cal. Rptr. 649, 659 (1975). Applying
Ransom, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has suggested that the rationale of
the decision was the unconscionability of taking premiums in advance where no immediate coverage would be forthcoming. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Grant, 268 F.2d 307, 310
(9th Cir. 1959).
37. The Ransom court's finding of unconscionability did not rest exclusively upon the
fact that the applicant had made an advance payment of the premium. What the court
declared to be unconscionable was the company's use of ambiguous language which would
lead the ordinary applicant to surrender the initial payment in the belief that he would
secure immediate coverage. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
38. See Smith v. Westland Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 3d 111, 122 n.12, 539 P.2d 433, 441
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drafter, could unilaterally decide that notice would be sufficient
to terminate temporary coverage. In dealing with contracts of
adhesion, the Supreme Court of California has stated:39
In standardized contracts.

. .

which are made by parties

of unequal bargaining strength, the California courts have long
been disinclined to effectuate clauses of limitation of liability
which are unclear. . inconspicuous or unconscionable.
Thus, a clear and conspicuous clause to this effect could be
stricken if found unconscionable." Although the court was not
faced with this issue in Smith, if pressed to decide it, it appears
that unambiguous written notice would not be considered sufficient.
In discussing the concept of unconscionability, the court in
Williams v. Walker-Thomas FurnitureCo. noted:"
Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include
an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties
together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable
to the other party.
Unconscionability thus includes both procedural and substantive aspects. On a procedural level, the insurance company
is in a position to dictate the terms of the conditional receipt. The
applicant is not given the opportunity to bargain over the method
of termination. He is confronted with the choice of either accepting the term which is offered or foregoing life insurance. The
substantive element is also present as the term is unreasonably
favorable to the stronger party. The company which receives payment at the time of application is in a decidedly advantageous
position. It is free to utilize the deposit; at the same time, the
applicant is dependent upon the good faith of the carrier for the
prompt return of his payment if he is rejected. 2 It is therefore
n.12, 123 Cal. Rptr. 649, 657 n.12 (1975). See also note 17 supra.
39. Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 879, 377 P.2d 284, 295, 27 Cal. Rptr.
172, 183 (1962) (holding that an insurance company could not exclude coverage for a flight
on an unscheduled airline because the decedent had a reasonable expectation that coverage would exist).
40. See Comment, Contracts of Adhesion Under CaliforniaLaw, 1 U. SAN FRAN. L.
REv. 306, 312 (1967).
41. 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
42. It has been noted that a rejected applicant might never bother to institute legal

action for the return of his or her deposit because of the relatively small amount involved.
See, e.g., Havighurst, Life Insurance Binding Receipts, 33 Ill. L. Rev. 180, 186 (1938);
Comment, "Binding Receipts" in California,supra note 19, at 299; Comment, Life Insur-
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doubtful that the court would permit coverage to be terminated
while the company remains free to return the premium at its
leisure.
If it is unconscionable for a company to retain premiums
after the decision to terminate coverage has been made, it is
equally unconscionable for a company to ever accept a premium
without providing coverage. The Ransom decision did not foreclose the possibility that temporary coverage could be avoided. 3
Similarly, in Thompson the California Supreme Court indicated
that payment of an amount equal to the first premium at the time
of application does not absolutely require coverage in return.44
The Smith court nevertheless construed Ransom to stand for the
proposition that the acceptance of premiums without providing
coverage is unconscionable45 and thus vitiated the effect of the
dicta in Thompson and Ransom.
Two possible solutions are suggested. State legislatures could
require all advance premiums to be held in special interestbearing accounts." Upon a finding of noninsurability, the proceeds of the account would be returned to the unsuccessful applicant within a specified period of time. This would eliminate the
twin evils of unearned advantage to the company and needless
delay in returning the payment to its rightful owner.
Alternatively, the current industry practice of accepting
47
premiums prior to the medical examination could be ended.
Clearly, where insurability receipts are employed, only the company benefits from receiving the premium prior to the date of the
examination. After that date, the insurable applicant could exchange the initial premium for a binding receipt. In this way, the
insurable applicant would still gain the advantage of protection
during the period between the examination and the issuance of
the formal policy. Likewise, this change in practice would not
place the uninsurable applicant in a position of dependence regarding the return of the premium, nor would it permit the company a benefit it has not earned.
ance Receipts: The Mystery of the Non-binding Binder, 63 Yale L.J. 523 (1954).
43. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
44. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
45. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
46. Cf., e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 7-103(2)-(a) (McKinney Supp. 1975)(requiring
that deposits given for the rental of apartments be kept in separate, interest bearing
accounts).
47. But see text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
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The continuous litigation regarding the legal effect of conditional receipts s demonstrates the reluctance of the industry to
alter its practices. From the point of view of the carrier, the acceptance of advance premiums continues to be advantageous. 9
The Smith decision reveals a marked sensitivity on the part
of the California Supreme Court to the problems of the consumer
vis-a-vis the insurance industry. The court's characterization of
the retention of the premium without providing coverage as unconscionable 0 had ensured that carriers will not escape interim
liability. Until state legislatures take affirmative action, the
courts will be obligated to continue to supervise the industry in
order to negate the effect of practices calculated to benefit the
51
carrier to the corresponding disadvantage of the public.
Barry C. Weiss
48. See Annot., 2 A.L.R. 2d 943 (1948).
49. See Smith v. Westland Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 3d 111, 124, 539 P.2d 433, 443, 123
Cal. Rptr. 649, 659 (1975).
50. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
51. [In the purely judicial development of our law we have taken the law
of insurance practically out of the category of contract, and we have established
that the duties of public service companies are not contractual, as the
nineteenth-century sought to make them, but are instead relational; they do not
flow from agreements which the public servant may make as he chooses, they
flow from the calling in which he has engaged and his consequent relation to
the public.
R. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAw 29 (1921).
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